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I. Introduction 
Law students come to law school with varying conceptions about 
judicial decision-making. As students move through law school, these 
conceptions may change multiple times and sometimes dramatically. Some 
students think that judges decide cases based on pure logic, while others 
believe that it is all politics or that judges simply follow their hunches.1 Still 
others may think that judges are motivated by loyalty to the executive who 
appointed them or are influenced by whether they ate breakfast that day.2 As 
 
† Linda L. Berger is the Family Foundation Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. Kathryn M. Stanchi is the E.L. Cord Professor of Law at 
the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. Bridget J. Crawford is a 
Professor of Law at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. Together, they are the 
co-editors of FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT (2016) and the U.S. Feminist Judgments Series published by Cambridge University Press. 
1. See Linda L. Berger, A Revised View of the Judicial Hunch, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: 
JALWD 1 (2013) (comparing studies of how unreflective intuition may bias decision-making with 
studies of how experts use intuition to call up potential solutions for effective problem-solving). 
2. There is some truth to these beliefs. See Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal 
Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 723-38 (1995) (discussing the ways that loyalty and gratitude 
might conflict with the duty of impartiality). The impetus for this article was a student who 
dismissed a judge’s opinion as the product of loyalty to the president who appointed him. See E-
mail from Laura E. Little to Kathryn Stanchi (October 1, 2019) (on file with author); see also Shai 
Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6889 
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legal educators, we know that judicial decision-making is a complex and 
multifaceted process that can reflect the influence of all these things and 
more. One of our primary goals should be to help students learn more about 
how judges actually go about making their decisions while dispelling the 
myth that judicial decision-making is a purely neutral and logical enterprise 
that proceeds by locating universally accepted black-letter rules and applying 
them to generally agreed-upon facts. This goal is made more difficult because 
legal commentators, judges, and politicians continue, at least publicly, to 
employ the myth to describe the process: the ideal judge simply finds and 
applies the law rather than engaging in fact selection, rule interpretation, and 
the development (or stagnation) of the law.3 
Most legal educators agree that our pedagogical goals are much more 
complex than equipping our students for a life in the law that involves the 
discovery and objective application of straightforward rules. Scholars have 
described what we teach in a variety of ways: we teach “how to think like a 
lawyer,” “critical reasoning,” mental and intellectual discipline, and legal 
interpretation and composition.4 Many of us engage in dialogue (Socratic or 
otherwise) with our students in the classroom, encouraging them to see all 
sides of a case and think carefully about the progression of the reasoning. 
This may be an excellent tool to meet our goals. But it is largely an oral 
process, and student comprehension and retention may be low, particularly if 
the final examination focuses largely on issue spotting and application of 
doctrinal rules. 
This essay offers a perspective-shifting approach to meeting some of our 
pedagogical goals in law school: the study of re-imagined judicial decisions. 
Our thesis is that exposing students to “alternative judgments”—opinions 
 
(2011) (study of Israeli judges suggests that the decisions of even expert judges were affected by 
external factors, such as whether they had a lunch break). 
3. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6 (2009), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56940 
/pdf/CHRG-111shrg56940.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX4F-Q5BN] (opening statement of Sen. Jeff 
Sessions) (“[O]ur legal system is based on a firm belief in an ordered universe and objective truth. 
The trial is the process by which the impartial and wise judge guides us to truth.”); Confirmation 
Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005), https://www.govinfo.gov/content 
/pkg/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS/pdf/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2NQ-8PT6] 
(statement of John G. Roberts) (comparing the judge’s role to that of a baseball umpire, merely 
applying the rules to call “balls and strikes”). 
4. See generally Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. 
L. REV. 517, 545–61 (1991) (collecting justifications for the case method of law school pedagogy); 
William A. Keener, Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE L.J. 143, 146 (1892); Paul F. Teich, 
Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case Against the Case System?, 36 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 167, 169–70 (1986). 
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that have been rewritten by authors who look at the law and the facts 
differently—will help students develop a more realistic and nuanced view of 
judicial decision-making: one that is aspirational and based in the real world, 
and one that allows them to envision their futures as successful advocates. 
The “alternative judgments” of the feminist judgments projects5 can enrich 
the law-school experience in multiple ways. First, seeing a written decision 
that differs from the original can help students think “outside the box” 
constructed by the original opinion by showing them a concrete example of 
another perspective written in judicial language. An alternative judgment 
tangibly illustrates for students that the original decision was not inevitable 
and that other perspectives are not only possible but legitimate. This method 
of introducing a new perspective is different and, we argue, more powerful 
than assigning a scholarly article that requires students to “transfer” scholarly 
language to judicial language. Second, the rewritten judgments show law’s 
potential to change and its ability to serve different accounts of justice. So 
many of our students come to law school wanting to “change the world” and 
become disheartened; alternative judgments can be an antidote to defeatism 
and cynicism. 
Third, alternative judgments counter the narrative that law is objective 
while other arguments are political or biased. Simply by comparison with the 
original opinions, the alternative judgments demonstrate that judges, like 
 
5. The term “feminist judgments projects” refers to recent, ongoing, and future scholarly 
projects devoted to rewriting judicial opinions from a feminist perspective. A group of Canadian 
lawyers and law professors came together to produce the first Feminist Judgment Project. Diana 
Majury, Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada, 18 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (2006) 
(introducing judgments published in 2008, although dated 2006 because of a backlog at the journal). 
This model was adapted and replicated in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
(Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn & Erika Rackley eds., 2010); AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW (Heather Douglas, Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker 
& Rosemary Hunter eds., 2014); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS]; NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ 
TROUBLES AND THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Máiréad Enright, Julie McCandless & 
Aoife O’Donoghue eds., 2017); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS OF AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND: TE RINO: A 
TWO-STRANDED ROPE (Elisabeth McDonald, Rhonda Powell, Māmari Stephens & Rosemary 
Hunter eds., 2017) [hereinafter AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS]; SCOTTISH 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: (RE)CREATING LAW FROM THE OUTSIDE IN (Sharon Cowan, Chloë 
Kennedy & Vanessa E. Munro eds., 2019); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Loveday Hodson & Troy Lavers eds., 2019); see also Jhuma Sen et al., Call for Papers, THE 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT: INDIA, https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi/call-for-papers 
[https://perma.cc/9UVF-Y7EX] (last visited Aug. 20, 2019); The African Feminist Judgments 
Project, CARDIFF L. & GLOBAL JUST., https://www.lawandglobaljustice.com/the-african-feminist-
judgments-project [https://perma.cc/W6PR-GGTR] (last visited Aug. 20, 2019); Sentencias con 
Perspective de Género MÉXICO (Feminist Judging Mexico), GÉNERO Y JUSTICIA (Mar. 15, 2008),  
https://feminismosgeneroyjusticia.blogspot.com [https://perma.cc/SZF4-AJT2] (last visited Aug. 
20, 2019).  
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other human beings, draw on what has been embedded in their intuitions and 
reasoning processes by culture and history as well as by their own 
backgrounds, experiences, and education. Fourth, feminist judgments 
provide tools for students to understand how persuasion and explanation are 
able to work effectively—in many different guises—even within the 
significant conventions and constraints of legal practice. Finally, but by no 
means least important, alternative feminist judgments are one of the only 
ways that “outsider” students—those whose perspectives have been 
historically erased or marginalized in law—can see themselves and their 
lived experiences reflected in the law. 
II. The Feminist Judgments Projects 
As the feminist judgments projects demonstrate, the most important 
constraint of judicial practice in common law jurisdictions is the expectation 
that judges will put their decisions in writing to explain and to justify the 
outcome.6 The late Judge Patricia Wald gave two primary reasons why judges 
write opinions instead of just announcing the results: one, to justify their 
power and reinforce their “oft-challenged” authority to decide; and two, to 
allow the public, the press, lawyers, and other judges to hold deciding judges 
accountable for consistency and fairness.7 
These two reasons for written decision-making form the impetus for the 
various feminist judgments projects: rewriting decisions is a way to challenge 
the power and authority of particular decisions and to hold judges 
accountable. Indeed, “the feminist judgment-writing projects have been 
animated by a perceived gap between law and justice . . . . Wherever such a 
gap is perceived, an alternative has already begun to be imagined.”8 The 
 
6. Penny Pether first documented the practice of systematic “unpublication” of federal appellate 
court opinions, suggesting that it developed as a reaction against appeals from marginalized 
litigants. She argued that the result—“private judging”—developed as a structural means for 
excluding marginalized people from the protection of the U.S. common law. Penelope Pether, 
Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 
1440–42 (2004); see also Penelope Pether, Strange Fruit: What Happened to the United States 
Doctrine of Precedent?, 60 VILL. L. REV. 443, 446 (2015) (reviewing trend beginning in 1960 
toward courts simply declaring “that some of their opinions would be published, which eventually 
came to mean precedential, and others would not”); Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: 
Toward a Thick Doctrine of Article III Duty; or Why The Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status 
Rules are (Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 955, 965 (2009) (noting 
that issuance of “unpublished” opinions is especially common in “collateral criminal appeals, prison 
conditions appeals, social security appeals, veterans’ benefits appeals, asylum appeals, and civil 
rights appeals of varying kinds” (footnotes omitted)).  
7. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995). 
8. Rosemary Hunter, Feminist Judgments as Teaching Resources, 2 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL 
SERIES, no. 5, 2012, at 47, 58. 
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history of the various feminist judgments projects, and in particular the 
proliferation of these projects across the globe, demonstrates the power of 
providing an alternative written account of judicial decisions. 
Beginning in Canada, spreading to the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and around the globe, feminist judgments projects emerged from an 
informal, international collaboration of feminist scholars and lawyers who 
decided to rewrite significant judicial opinions affecting traditionally 
marginalized individuals and groups. One of their primary goals was  to 
demonstrate how the use of feminist theories, methods, and perspectives 
might have changed the reasoning, the result, or both.9 Beginning with the 
Women’s Court of Canada (WCC), the first organizing group of law 
professors and activists began their project in 2004 and published the first six 
rewritten decisions based on Section 15 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms in 2008.10 That collection was followed in 2010 by the English 
collaboration, which included twenty-three rewritten opinions originally 
issued by the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal, or the Privy Council. The 
next published feminist judgments project came from Australia, 
encompassing twenty-four opinions from courts ranging from trial courts to 
the High Court. The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, rewriting twenty-five 
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, was published in 2016. 
The Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project and New Zealand/Aotearoa 
Feminist Judgments Project followed a year later. The Scottish and 
international projects came to press in late 2019,11 and projects are under way 
in India, Africa, and Mexico.12 
The signature achievement of the feminist judgments projects has been 
to combat the myth of a purely logical judicial decision-making process and 
to demonstrate that judicial decision-making is rarely detached from personal 
background and experience. By re-imagining the reasoning of judicial 
opinions through the added insight of feminist theories and methods, while 
bound by the precedent and facts of the time, the feminist judgment authors 
are able to write and decide like actual judges, while still accounting for 
intersecting inequalities resulting from gender, race, class, disability, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, ethnicity, immigration status and national 
identity. The power of the alternative judgments in the classroom comes from 
comparison: they look and sound like real judicial decisions but consider 
issues of social justice that are often not a part of the traditional discourse of 
law. 
 
9. See sources cited supra note 5. 
10. Although the publication date is 2006, the judgments were published in 2008 because of a 
backlog at the journal. Majury, supra note 5, at 4. 
11. See sources cited supra note 5. 
12. See sources cited supra note 5. 
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III. How Students Benefit When Teachers Use Feminist Judgments in the 
Classroom 
At law schools in the U.S. and internationally, as well as in 
undergraduate courses, professors are bringing feminist judgments into 
upper-level seminars and courses on jurisprudence, brief and opinion writing, 
and specific subject matters such as tax and employment discrimination. By 
simply introducing alternative feminist judgments, teachers prompt 
comparative analysis and show students the concrete reality that the original 
opinion was not the only plausible option and the original reasoning was not 
the only possible logic. In this essay, we discuss only a few of the tangible 
benefits of teaching with alternative judgments; we encourage professors to 
experiment with using these judgments in the classroom to uncover even 
more benefits. We have organized the benefits into three broad categories: 
(1) language learning; (2) critical thinking and argumentation; and (3) 
inspiration. 
One key benefit of reading the alternative judgments in comparison with 
the original judgments is linguistic. The comparison allows students to see 
clear examples of the use of language and how different voices and words 
affect writers and readers. Teaching with feminist judgments links together 
methods for learning effective language use with methods for learning how 
language use can effect change. Students see how other writers transformed 
theory into practice and how experienced brief writers have crafted 
arguments and analysis to advance social justice. The reasoning in the 
judgments gives students models for social justice arguments and analysis in 
legal writing. 
Teaching alternative judgments also stimulates critical thinking and 
argumentation. The alternative judgments expose students to facts, voices, 
and history that have often been hidden or ignored. By exposing students to 
new sources of legal argument, the judgments can help students see how 
precedent can pose obstacles to social justice while simultaneously showing 
them a way around those obstacles. Because they reveal the contingency of 
what appears to be settled law, the alternative judgments broaden the array 
of persuasive tools by expanding student understanding of available legal 
theories and showing how to use feminist and critical theory methods in brief 
and opinion writing. 
The judgments also serve an important inspirational function. They can 
give students who rarely see their voices or their lived experiences in judicial 
opinions the opportunity to see themselves in law. This teaches students who 
may feel marginalized or erased by law the valuable lesson that they are 
welcome in law (and law school) and that their voices are just as valid and 
judicial as the “traditional” judicial voice. The judgments can also serve to 
awaken—or reawaken—student zeal for law as a vehicle for social change. 
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They also introduce students to the many divergent versions of feminist 
theory and feminist history and show that feminism is not monolithic or 
static.13 By writing their own alternative judgments, students learn that they 
have a role to play in crafting arguments to advance their own alternative 
versions of the future. Finally, because feminist judgments projects are 
global, alternative judgments provide a springboard for discussion about 
comparative and international perspectives on law and social justice. 
A. Teaching Language’s Power 
Language and law are so interdependent that students must understand 
the constraints of one in order to understand how to work with the other. 
Thus, “[t]he capacity of law to achieve justice, procedurally and 
substantively, is linked to the capacity of the language of law to challenge 
assumptions and existing rules, norms, and practices, as well as to offer new 
ways of thinking about social dilemmas.”14 In this section, we explore just 
three examples of how alternative judgments can stimulate student thinking 
about what a judicial opinion is and is not; the importance of facts in judicial 
decision making and how theory can be transformed into practice. 
1. Illustrating How Feminist Writing Can Be Judicial 
By reading alternative feminist judgments, students begin to appreciate 
the range of effective language uses that are possible even within the 
relatively narrow rhetorical context of judging. Judges write within a context 
of constraints that require them to comply with controlling precedent, gain 
the assent of their colleagues, and adhere to conventions of style, voice, and 
citation use. Nonetheless, as Judge Wald emphasized: 
[J]udges still use rhetoric to maneuver. The way they present the facts, 
the way they describe rules and standards of review, the way they 
“handle” precedent, their decisions to write separately or stay with the 
pack, all provide wide avenues in which to drive the law forward. A 
judge’s individual skill at working these levers of power, and doing so 
in a way that does not overly antagonize colleagues, continues to have 
 
13. “Feminism” comprises a multiplicity of theories, methods, and approaches. Bridget J. 
Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Linda L. Berger, Feminist Judging Matters: How Feminist Theory 
and Methods Affect the Process of Judgment, 47 U. BALT. L. REV. 167, 167–68 (2018). Nonetheless, 
feminist judgments have some things in common. These include an awareness of the ways in which 
apparently neutral or objective legal rules and practices have varying, and nonneutral, effects on 
individuals. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to the U.S. 
Feminist Judgments Project, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 3–5. 
14. Presentation Proposal from Andrea McArdle et al. to the Association of American Law 
Schools 2 (Jan. 6, 2018) (on file with authors). 
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a powerful influence on decision making. That is why, in the end, 
judges—as well as their words—matter so much.15 
How to write within and yet through those constraints is one of the most 
important lessons students learn by reading feminist judgments. This is a 
lesson not only of opinion writing but of legal writing across the board. With 
some of the rewritten judgments, professors can show students a feminist 
judgment that hews closely to the original, changing only key aspects of the 
reasoning to create stronger precedent. This experience forces students to 
rethink what a “feminist” judicial opinion is. As Rosemary Hunter noted 
when writing about the British project: 
Some students who expected that judgments written from a feminist 
perspective would be biased or incoherent were forced to rethink their 
preconceptions. . . . Students comparing the two judgments found that 
it was the feminist judgment that appeared neutral, dispassionate, 
“legal” and “objective,” while the original judgment was more 
emotional, partial and overdetermined.16 
That kind of re-evaluation of expectations can work a significant shift 
in student understanding of the law and its processes. For example, Deborah 
L. Rhode’s rewritten feminist judgment17 in Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency18 makes very subtle changes to the original opinion, which is thought 
to be the first example of the United States Supreme Court applying the 
concept of substantive equality to a gender justice claim. The Johnson Court 
recognized that when men and women are in different situations, inequitable 
outcomes might result from applying identical rules.19 What Rhode does is 
move some material from footnotes to the main text and expand on the 
Court’s reasoning—the same reasoning was in the original, but more 
obliquely written.20 Rhode re-wrote the opinion to maintain the slim 5-4 
majority that supported the original opinion while also clarifying and 
solidifying the precedential value of the opinion.21 In particular, Rhode 
expands from the original opinion to explain what “merit” and “equality” 
mean in the context of a biased hiring process.22 Rhode’s rewritten judgment 
 
15. Wald, supra note 7, at 1419. 
16. Hunter, supra note 8, at 53. 
17. Deborah L. Rhode, Rewritten Opinion in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, in U.S. 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 327–40. 
18. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
19. Id. at 637–38, 641–42. 
20. See Deborah Gordon, Commentary on Johnson v. Transportation Agency, in U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 325. 
21. Id. at 327. 
22. Id. at 324. 
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shows students an opinion with clearly articulated feminist ideas that might 
have commanded a majority in the Supreme Court.23 
2. Demonstrating the Difference Facts Can Make in Judicial Opinions 
Early in law school, students are taught to read to find “the meaning” of 
a text by focusing primarily on language and rules: 
When students attempt to tell the stories of conflict embodied in the 
cases assigned for their courses, they typically start by focusing on the 
content of the story. First-year law professors insistently refocus the 
telling of these stories on the sources of authority that give them power 
within a legal framework. What was the court authorized to decide? If 
it writes about hypothetical situations other than the one before it, 
students learn, this part of the story is to be separated from the 
“holding”—the authoritative part of the case. The holding is valid only 
if uttered by the correct authority, following the correct procedure, 
delivered in the correct form. This is a new and very different sense of 
where to look when we decide what counts as a “fact,” how to 
construct valid accounts of events, and where to demand accuracy.24 
Although students learn to focus precisely and in depth on “form, 
authority, and legal-linguistic contexts,” their comments on “content, 
 
23. Id. at 326.  
24. Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal Realist Pedagogy, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 483, 494–95 (2007) (footnotes omitted). While Mertz emphasized that “there is 
without question a certain genius to a linguistic-legal framework that treats all individuals the 
same,” she pointed out that even though the move toward abstraction can counter aspects of social 
context that lead to bias, “this process conceals the ways legal results are often quite reflective of 
existing power dynamics, while simultaneously pulling lawyers away from grounded moral 
judgment and fully contextualized considerations of human conflict.” ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE 
LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 220 (2007). Thus, “the legal 
system itself, while purporting to serve all citizens equally, can hide behind the screen provided by 
its legal-linguistic filter, concealing even from itself, the way that inequalities are integral to its 
structure.” Id. at 220. Similarly, in Educating Lawyers, the Carnegie Foundation investigators 
concluded that:  
By questioning and argumentative exchange with faculty, students are led to analyze 
situations by looking for points of dispute or conflict and considering as “facts” only 
those details that contribute to someone’s staking a legal claim on the basis of 
precedent. The case-dialogue method drills students, over and over, in first abstracting 
from natural contexts, then operating upon the “facts” so abstracted according to 
specified rules and procedures, and drawing conclusions based upon that reasoning. 
Students discover that to “think like a lawyer” means redefining messy situations of 
actual or potential conflict as opportunities for advancing a client’s cause through legal 
argument before a judge or through negotiation. By contrast, the task of connecting 
these conclusions with the rich complexity of actual situations that involve full-
dimensional people, let alone the job of thinking through the social consequences or 
ethical aspects of the conclusions, remains outside the case-dialogue method.  
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF 
LAW 28 (2007).  
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morality, and social context” are treated as unimportant.25 Reading 
alternative judgments can provide the missing piece to allow students to 
explore the content, morality, and social context of legal opinions. Several of 
the feminist judgments in the U.S. Feminist Judgments volume explored the 
appellate record to unearth additional facts that were omitted from the 
original opinions. Teaching the feminist judgments with expanded factual 
narratives can show students the critical importance of facts to legal 
reasoning: how decisions about what facts to include can fundamentally 
change the nature of the opinion and affect the legitimacy of the holding and 
outcome and how bias sometimes arises more subtly through omission of 
facts. 
An important example is Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s rewrite26 of 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.27 In that case, the original opinion makes no 
mention of the race of the parties.28 In her rewritten opinion, Onwuachi-
Willig emphasizes the importance of stating that both the victim of the hostile 
work environment and her harasser were African Americans working in a 
white-dominated business; she explains that ignoring race in the legal context 
is a flawed example of the widespread legal fiction that law can be applied in 
a “color blind” manner in a society that is anything but color blind.29 
Although the original opinion does not mention race, racial stereotypes could 
explain much of the reasoning of the opinion, including the oft-criticized 
reasoning that the victim’s manner of dress is relevant to whether the 
harassment was “welcome.”30 Racial dynamics could also help explain why 
the victim was hesitant to report.31 In addition to revealing the race of the 
parties, Onwuachi-Willig also gives the reader other details about the 
victim’s socio-economic situation, her past troubles, and her relationship 
with the perpetrator.32 These additional facts make the rewritten Meritor a 
rich exploration of racial politics and the law, well worth assigning as an 
example of how Black experience has been erased from law. 
Another example of a rewritten opinion using expanded facts is Ann 
McGinley’s feminist judgment33 in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
 
25. Mertz, supra note 24, at 496.  
26. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Rewritten Opinion in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in U.S. 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 303–21. 
27. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
28. See id. 
29. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 26, at 309. 
30. Id. at 317. 
31. Id. at 311. 
32. Id. at 304, 312. 
33. Ann McGinley, Rewritten Opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., Inc., in U.S. 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 414–25. 
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Servs., Inc.,34 which includes graphic details of sexual harassment. The 
original Oncale did not elaborate on the nature of the harassment, stating that 
as matter of “dignity” the Court would describe those acts only generally as 
“sex-related, humiliating actions.”35 As McGinley writes, “A decision not to 
relate the facts alleged protects those who may have engaged in the behavior 
and diminishes the perceived severity of the acts.”36 By contrast, McGinley’s 
narrative includes details that make clear the extent and severity of the 
harassment, including that several employees and supervisors restrained 
Oncale while one employee “placed his penis on the back of Oncale’s head” 
and one supervisor “forced a bar of soap between Oncale’s buttocks” while 
another employee restrained him in a shower.37 McGinley’s inclusion of 
these facts provides an important counter-narrative to the misapprehension 
that sexual harassment law is “political correctness” gone rampant and stifles 
innocent sexual joking and banter (a narrative that the original opinion 
explicitly mentions). It is also critical to McGinley’s reasoning that the 
harassment against Oncale was a product of violent gender-policing in a 
hyper-masculine work environment, which, in McGinley’s view, is 
prohibited by Title VII.38 
3. Showing Students How to Shift From Theory to Practice 
Law students hear about theory in the classroom and read about theory 
in treatises and law review articles, but law school is still structured so that 
legal theory is somewhat divorced from practice. This may lead students to 
think that practice is about the “black letter” law and theory is for law 
professors.39 Feminist judgments directly challenge this separation and 
encourage students to view theory as a vehicle for enriching the practice of 
law and one that is essential to crafting effective arguments that advance 
social justice. Many alternative judgments incorporate multiple feminist 
theories, as well as critical race theory, poverty law theory, and others. In 
doing so, alternative judgments give students exposure to ideas about gender 
and racial justice they would not otherwise encounter, provide templates and 
resources for social justice arguments, and help students think critically and 
creatively. 
 
34. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).  
35. Id. at 76–77. 
36. McGinley, supra note 33, at 415. 
37. Id. at 416. The commentary to this opinion points out that accounting for Oncale’s story in 
this kind of detail is grounded in feminist legal theory, especially narrative and dignity strands. See 
Margaret E. Johnson, Commentary on Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., Inc., in U.S. 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 408–14. 
38. Id. at 413. 
39. Kathryn Stanchi, Step Away From the Casebook: A Call for Balance and Integration in Law 
School Pedagogy, 42 HARV. J. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 611, 613 (2008).  
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For example, two feminist judgments provide clear practical examples 
of the tension between formal and substantive equality theory. Valorie 
Vojdik’s rewrite40 of Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s majority opinion in United 
States v. Virginia41 takes on the problems of a purely formal approach to anti-
discrimination law. Choosing to concur in the judgment that the all-male 
admission policy of the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) was 
unconstitutional, Vojdik (unlike Ginsburg) has no need to convince five male 
colleagues to agree with her.42 Vojdik was free to provide additional 
reasoning to support Ginsburg’s majority opinion. Rooted in anti-
stereotyping and anti-subordination theories, Vojdik’s opinion urges that 
merely ruling that women must be admitted to VMI without requiring VMI 
to substantially change its approach to education would result in a hollow 
victory for women seeking to attend VMI.43 In comparison with the original 
opinion, Vojdik’s rewritten opinion shows students the two theories 
translated into practice, and the difference theory can make to practical 
outcomes. 
Similarly, Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, in her rewritten opinion44 in Muller v. 
Oregon,45 also confronts an issue that divided, and continues to divide, 
feminists. Practical feminists see the legislation in Muller, which mandated 
limited working hours for women, as the necessary first step to providing 
protection for all workers;46 difference feminists tend to see legislation like 
the statute at issue in Muller as recognition that women’s ability to become 
pregnant and bear children require some protection in the workplace.47 
Laufer-Ukeles grounds her opinion more in the third-wave feminist approach 
that staunchly rejects any “protectionist” legislation based on stereotypes of 
women. In her rewritten dissent, Laufer-Ukeles acknowledges that the 
employer is the party most advantaged by her approach of striking down the 
legislation, but concludes that leaving the law intact hurts all women by 
 
40. Valorie Vojdik, Rewritten Opinion in United States v. Virginia, in U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 389–407. 
41. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  
42. See Vojdik, supra note 40, at 389. 
43. Christine M. Venter, Commentary on United States v. Virginia, in U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 397. 
44. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Rewritten Opinion in Muller v. Oregon, in U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 83–97. 
45. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) 
46. Andrea Donoff, Commentary on Muller v. Oregon, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra 
note 5, at 80–81. 
47. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 
1285 (1987) (female “difference” whether it is biological or cultural should be costless); Lundy R. 
Langston, Women in the New Millennium: The Promises of the Past Are Now the Problems for the 
Millennium, 6 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5–6 (1999) (noting that because men and women are 
different, entitlements should not be based on gender). 
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reinforcing stereotypes of women as weaker than men and thereby impeding 
the movement toward equality.48 Laufer-Ukeles’s opinion makes for a 
striking tool to teach the divergence between theoretical approaches, and 
particularly in contrast to the original, provides a stark example of how 
different theoretical approaches would look in practice. 
The rewritten opinion in Oncale also illustrates how theory influences 
statutory construction.49 The original opinion, written by Justice Scalia, 
purports to be an exercise in simply reading the words of the text.50 
McGinley, by contrast, uses masculinities theory and sex stereotyping theory 
(and case law) to hold that Title VII’s prohibition against sex stereotyping 
prohibits harassment based on a perceived failure to meet gender 
expectations.51 This allows McGinley to reason that Oncale’s treatment by 
his work colleagues was “because of sex” whether they “thought him to be 
insufficiently masculine or because they perceived him to be homosexual.”52 
McGinley’s opinion teaches students the complexity involved in interpreting 
words in statutes and how perspective and theory can change the way a statute 
is construed. 
B. Stimulating Critical Thinking and Creative Argumentation 
Comparative analysis—simply comparing the original opinions with the 
feminist judgments—encourages students to engage in critical analysis and 
evaluation. What new evidence was introduced into the feminist judgment? 
What different questions were raised? What new issues were addressed? 
What different kinds of reasoning did the two opinions use? 
Allowing students to see how a very different precedent could have been 
created with the same legal and linguistic constraints shows them definitively 
that decision making is not a process of merely finding the right “rule” and 
applying it. Rather, the legal decision-making is a creative, elaborate, 
complex process, more art than science.53 Showing students alternative 
judgments undermines the concept of purely neutral judicial decision-making 
and encourages students to think outside the box, gives them additional tools 
to develop their own arguments, and stimulates critical thinking about the 
law. In the following sections, we address only a few—developing critical 
 
48. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 44, at 96–97. 
49. Ann C. McGinley, Rewritten Opinion in Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., in 
U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 414–25. 
50. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
51. McGinley, supra note 49, at 420–24. 
52. Id. at 424. 
53. See Timothy W. Floyd, Literature for Lawyers and Judges, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 967, 967 
(1998) (reviewing BARRY R. SCHALLER, A VISION OF AMERICAN LAW: JUDGING LAW, 
LITERATURE, AND THE STORIES WE TELL (1997)).  
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analytical skills, learning from history, and providing models for different 
types of reasoning and arguments. 
1. Developing Critical Analysis 
All the feminist judgments are examples of critical analysis and 
evaluation,54 but those that explore reasoning or legal foundations that depart 
sharply from the original are excellent tools for showing students the multiple 
avenues for legal decision-making. For example, in her rewritten opinion55 
of Harris v. McRae,56 Leslie Griffin reinvigorates the Establishment Clause 
as a basis for challenging abortion restrictions. In her reasoning, she 
confronts the traditional reluctance of judges to acknowledge legislators’ 
religious motivations for abortion laws, even when evidence of that 
motivation is clear and convincing—as it was in the case of the Hyde 
Amendment, which denied public funding for medically necessary 
abortions.57 
Griffin’s opinion concludes that the Hyde Amendment violates both the 
Establishment Clause and equal protection because Congress had enacted “a 
personal moral principle unrelated to the Medicaid Act into law.”58 In her 
opinion, she carefully traces the legislative history through many iterations, 
including Representative Henry Hyde’s comments on the floor of the House 
that he “certainly would like to prevent, if [he] could legally, anybody having 
an abortion.”59 In addition to laying bare the underlying reasons for the 
passage of the Hyde Amendment, Griffin’s rewrite illuminates the original 
opinion’s cursory treatment of the argument that the Amendment violates the 
Establishment Clause.60 Griffin’s rewritten opinion is an excellent illustration 
 
54. For a detailed analysis, see Rebecca Flanagan, The Kids Aren’t Alright: Rethinking the Law 
Student Skills Deficit, 15 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 135, 144 (2015): 
Critical thinking has many definitions and can be broken into two forms: critical 
thinking with a cognitive component, and a disposition to think critically. A generally 
accepted definition of the cognitive component of critical thinking includes 
“systematic evaluation of what you have heard and read . . . an ability to ask and answer 
critical [interrelated] questions at appropriate times” and the formulation of follow-up 
questions. The disposition to think critically includes an “inclination to ask challenging 
questions and follow the reasons and evidence wherever they lead, tolerance for new 
ideas, willingness to use reason and evidence to solve problems, and willingness to see 
complexity in problems.” At their core, both types of critical thinking involve 
questioning knowledge. 
55. Leslie C. Griffin, Rewritten Opinion in Harris v. McRae, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 5, at 247–56. 
56. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
57. Griffin, supra note 55, at 250–53.  
58. Id. at 247. 
59. Id. at 248–50. 
60. Mary Ziegler, Commentary on Harris v. McRae, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 
4, at 244–45. 
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and model for students wanting to develop a broader range of arguments in 
cases involving law and morality. It certainly would stimulate discussion of 
how the Establishment Clause is used (and not used) when religious 
motivation is obvious. Indeed, one of the authors pointed out this feminist 
judgment to a student writing a law review note about fetal burial laws; that, 
in turn, led to the student’s digging deeply into the legislative record to 
uncover religious motivations for the law. 
The judgments can also be used to spark class discussion about what 
particular legal standards mean, about the indeterminacy of language, and 
how different perspectives can mean very different interpretations of words 
like “intermediate scrutiny.” For example, David Cohen’s rewritten opinion61 
in Rostker v. Goldberg62 engaged in a rigorous version of intermediate 
scrutiny. In Rostker, the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s determination 
that only men must register for military service.63 In his rewritten feminist 
judgment, David Cohen acknowledges the test: “that the law must have an 
important government purpose and be substantially related to that purpose,” 
noting that only the second part of the test is at issue.64 But, in a detailed 
discussion, he outlines the ways in which restricting the draft to men could 
be considered substantially related to the goal of military excellence only 
because of “gross stereotypes and generalizations about men and women.”65 
Not only did he demonstrate that the law was based on stereotypes of 
women,66 but he also examines the ways in which the law stereotypes men as 
well, particularly as “violent, aggressive, strong, and powerful.”67 Because 
the law was based on these overbroad generalizations, Cohen finds that it 
violated equal protection and is thus unconstitutional.68 Step by step, the 
opinion provides students with a method for rebutting easy conclusions, 
including the dissent’s argument that Congress acted intentionally.69 
2. Confronting History and Hearing Missing Voices 
Feminist judgments are one of the only places where marginalized 
voices and histories, including some that mirror students’ own experiences, 
 
61. David S. Cohen, Rewritten Opinion in Rostker v. Goldberg, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 5, at 277–96. The opinion also provides a roadmap for demolishing “identity-based 
classifications in the military context,” citing to intentional deceptions of the Court related to its 
reasoning in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Id. at 283–84. 
62. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
63. Id. at 83. 
64. Cohen, supra note 61, at 285. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 285–87. 
67. Id. at 287–88.  
68. Id. at 296. 
69. Id. at 291–93.  
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are incorporated into judicial opinions. This makes the feminist judgments 
one of the only teaching tools that allows students to see, in a practical law-
making context, the histories and experiences left out of the legal canon. 
Seeing that history70 not only gives students a broader appreciation for how 
law works and what experiences it values but also, as we discuss later, is a 
way for students within those marginalized groups to feel seen and heard in 
the law. 
For example, the rewritten feminist judgment71 in Nguyen v. INS72 is a 
deep historical lesson in the ways that racial bias and patriarchy have shaped 
U.S. nationality and citizenship law. The statute at issue in Nguyen limited 
the ability of fathers to transmit citizenship to non-marital children born 
abroad.73 The feminist judgment and commentary make clear that like the 
bans many states had on inter-racial marriage, the policy in Nguyen similarly 
reinforced white supremacy and racial exclusion by denying citizenship to 
bi- or multi-racial children.74 Author Ilene Durst points out that many of non-
marital children born to U.S. fathers were the result of U.S. military 
occupation in other countries, and that the military strongly discouraged male 
service members from marrying the foreign mothers of their children.75 
Providing a chilling historical echo of current immigration policy, Durst 
concludes that “restrictions on citizens conferring citizenship upon spouses 
or children were fed by fear of ‘mass reproduction’ of non-whites” in the 
United States.76 Reading the feminist Nguyen would give students a lens 
through which to see the repetition of history in current U.S. immigration 
policy.77 
Similarly, Teri McMurtry-Chubb, the author of the rewritten feminist 
judgment78 in Loving v. Virginia,79 foregrounds the history of slavery and 
 
70. Brent Staples, the New York Times columnist who won the Pulitzer Prize in 2019, 
frequently posts on social media: “History is the only education; everything else is just training.” 
Valerie Russ, Brent Staples talks about his path from Chester to a Pulitzer Prize, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER (April 22, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/brent-staples-pulitzer-editorial-
writing-2019-chester-race-social-justice-philadelphia-20190422.html [https://perma.cc/S3FT-
JNSY]. 
71. Ilene Durst, Rewritten Opinion in Nguyen v. INS, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 
5, at 473–84. 
72. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).  
73. Id. at 59. 
74. Sandra Park, Commentary on Nguyen v. INS, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, 
at 468–71. 
75. Durst, supra note 71, at 477–80. 
76. Id. at 479. 
77. Id. at 477–80. 
78. Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, in U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 119–36. 
79. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 
56 Texas Law Review Online [Vol. 98:40 
slave marriages in that opinion to make clear that the original opinion’s 
treatment of the case as primarily about the “right to marry” bypassed the 
core issue.80 In McMurtry-Chubb’s view, the miscegenation law in Loving is 
just one example of a complex web of legal structures that were created to 
construct and reinforce white supremacy.81 McMurtry-Chubb’s recounting of 
the violent history of slavery that led to laws like the one at issue in Loving 
shows the law’s deep interdependence with history and the importance of 
history to interpreting law. It also shows the importance of naming and 
confronting the shameful and brutal history of the law’s treatment of African-
American peoples to creating a strong precedent that will lead to legal reform. 
Comparing McMurtry-Chubb’s starkly historical account with the original 
opinion, which mentions white supremacy in passing but relies on 
abstractions,82 leaves students with a lesson in history that much of the law 
omits. 
The rewritten feminist judgment83 in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey84 centers on including the voices of poor women, rural women, and 
Native American women who were erased and ignored in the original 
decision. In the original Casey, the Supreme Court upheld several parts of the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, including requiring women to wait 24 
hours after receiving specific information to obtain an abortion.85 In her 
rewritten majority opinion, Lisa Pruitt points out the disconnect created by 
the case: laws like the one at issue in Casey impact primarily poor women, 
but most judges have little understanding of the lived conditions of poor 
women.86 For these poor women, and especially for rural women and Native 
American women, enormous challenges are raised by laws requiring them to 
travel long distances to find abortion providers.87 
In the original opinion, the question of undue burden was asked 
abstractly, about a mythical woman with substantial resources and no 
 
80. McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 78, at 124.  
81. Id. at 134–35.  
82. Inga N. Laurent, Commentary on Loving v. Virginia, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra 
note 5, at 114–119. 
83. Lisa Pruitt, Rewritten Opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 365–83. 
84. 505 U.S. 833 (1922). 
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86. Pruitt, supra note 83, at 377–78; see, e.g., ALL. FOR JUST., Broadening the Bench: 
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constraints or obligations. As a result, for that woman, very few burdens 
would be so substantial as to prevent from accessing abortion. In the re-
imagined opinion, Pruitt puts “missing” women—poor, rural, Native—at the 
center of her reasoning and vividly illustrates how the Pennsylvania law 
creates a substantial and impermissible burden for these very real women.88 
As Pruitt writes: “The meaning of any legal standard can only be understood 
by considering the actual situations in which it applies. . . . [The Pennsylvania 
law] has a much greater impact on the poor and on those living far from an 
abortion provider.”89 Particularly when contrasted with the original, the 
rewritten Casey shows how particular voices are erased by the law and how 
judicial decision making is hampered when social and historical context is 
absent. 
3. Giving Students Models for Novel Arguments 
Social justice advocates often blend stories of individuals affected by 
injustice with the context provided by historical and social science 
background information. Studying feminist judgments helps students learn 
this “feminist practical reasoning”90 and “narrative feminist method”91 in a 
practice context so that they can use these methods to craft their own 
arguments. Having models available in legal language makes it easier for 
students to make the leap when they engage in advocacy writing of their own. 
Feminist practical reasoning and narrative method appear in several of 
the feminist judgments. Maria Isabel Medina’s rewritten opinion92 in Town 
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,93 for example, began with the long history of 
protective orders—unrecognized and unenforced—that led the Colorado 
legislature to enact legislation expressly designed to protect individuals and 
families from domestic violence.94 Notwithstanding this legislation, the 
original opinion found that Ms. Gonzales and her children had no 
constitutional due process right to police protection, even though she had a 
restraining order against her husband and the father of her three young 
daughters.95 Despite repeated calls to the police on the day her husband 
kidnapped the girls, no efforts apparently were made to find him, and the girls 
 
88. Id. at 377–80. 
89. Id. at 376. 
90. See U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 15. 
91. Id. 
92. Maria Isabel Medina, Rewritten Opinion in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, in U.S. 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 509–26. 
93. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).  
94. Medina, supra note 92, at 509–13. 
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were killed by their father.96 In Medina’s rewritten judgment, the tragic facts 
of the Gonzales case and the broader social context of the legislation provided 
the foundation for the holding that the benefit created by the state was a 
property interest creating a due process right.97 
Ann Bartow’s rewritten judgment98 in Gebser v. Lago Independent 
School District99 is a lesson in narrative methodology and its use to provide 
a solid justification for a legal holding. In Gebser, a teenage girl brought a 
Title IX action against a school district because a trusted teacher and mentor 
had had sexual intercourse with the girl for several years.100 The original 
opinion held that the student could not sue her school district under Title IX 
and referred to the statutory rape as a “relationship” between a girl and a 
teacher.101 In the feminist rewrite, Bartow focuses almost immediately on 
“what should have been the majority’s central understanding of this case: 
When a teacher sexually assaults a minor student, they are not having a 
relationship. The sex is non-consensual as a matter of law. The student is 
being raped.”102 
The heart of the feminist opinion is narrative storytelling as “an 
important tool for reframing the stories of people . . . who have not received 
justice from the Court.”103 Bartow criticizes the language and narrative tone 
of the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court, which said that the 13-year-old 
had a “relationship” with her teacher that “grew,” and used similar phrases 
that revealed “embedded and problematic perceptions” of young girls and 
their ability to consent to sexual intercourse with a teacher.104 By uncovering 
parts of the student’s story that were neglected by the Fifth Circuit and the 
original Supreme Court opinion, the feminist opinion is designed to show the 
bias and injustice of the legal standard before it makes the argument for a 
new standard. 
C. Inspiring and Broadening Perspectives 
Assigning the feminist judgments provides much needed lessons 
missing from the core canon of legal pedagogy. For decades, law students 
and law professors have criticized both the substance and process of law 
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teaching as marginalizing to students from non-traditional backgrounds.105 
This pedagogical failure certainly has ramifications for what our students 
learn and whether we are creating future lawyers and judges who are capable 
of handling an increasingly diverse clientele. But it can also contribute to 
student disengagement, attrition, and cynicism about the law while 
reinforcing the long-standing, unforgivable lack of diversity in law practice 
and law-making. Exposing students to diversity in legal thinking and thinking 
by diverse legal writers is an essential part of law school pedagogy. Feminist 
judgments can help fill that pedagogical gap. 
1. Developing Student Identity as Lawyers, Advocates, and Legal 
Writers 
Perhaps the most important achievement of teaching with feminist 
judgments is to equip students to envision themselves as advocates and legal 
writers with the potential to advance causes they embrace. Law students from 
traditionally underrepresented communities rarely see familiar individuals 
playing positive or active roles within the legal system. Teachers using 
feminist judgments in the classroom can help students recognize their part in 
bringing about alternative versions of the future or remedying injustice. One 
of the authors of an alternative feminist judgment in the U.S. Feminist 
Judgments volume wrote that as she was drafting her rewritten opinion in 
Loving v. Virginia,106 one of her students stopped by. Asked to wait, he began 
to read the opinion over her shoulder: 
The sentences I had written were my reframing of the issue for the 
U.S. Supreme Court. When I noticed he was reading, I turned in my 
chair to witness his eyes grow wide and his hand rise to cover his 
mouth. He said to me “Professor M-C! I had no idea we could do this!” 
My student is an African American male. By “we” he meant African 
Americans; by “this,” he meant act as autonomous knowledge 
producers to push for inclusive inquiry in U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.107 
 
105. See, e.g., Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal 
Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263, 299–
300 (2000) (“[P]edagogical techniques that are utilized in the law school classroom, which is 
designed architectonically and epistemologically to be hierarchical, have been repeatedly shown to 
alienate and silence students, especially students of color and women from different backgrounds.”); 
Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted But Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at 
Law School, 5 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 3, 44 (2013); Jonathan Feingold & Doug Souza, 
Measuring the Racial Unevenness of Law School, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 97 
(2013). 
106. See McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 78, at 119. 
107. Bridget J. Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Linda L. Berger, Teaching with Feminist 
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One of the editors of the Supreme Court volume had a similar 
experience when teaching a student to write an alternative judgment. The 
assignment was to rewrite Rogers v. American Airlines,108 a case finding that 
an employer policy against cornrow hairstyles did not violate Title VII.109 
That student, an African American woman, was concerned about sounding 
like an “angry Black woman” in her rewritten opinion, but after reading some 
of the judgments by African American women law professors, came to 
realize that her voice was valid, legitimate, and worthy of being heard. 
By reinforcing the voices of the marginalized as legitimate and 
“judicial,” the concept of alternative or re-imagined judgments helps students 
develop their personal and professional identities. These judgments help 
students from groups traditionally underrepresented in law navigate the 
difficult and sometimes hostile law school space. Students not only benefit 
in terms of professional identity development but also feel more at home 
when they participate in reading and writing opinions that take seriously the 
problems of individuals and families who differ from traditional 
expectations. Feminist judgments provide an avenue for students to see “fully 
contextualized considerations of human conflict,” and for some 
nontraditional students to see themselves and their everyday experiences 
reflected in judicial opinions. 
Examples of feminist judgments that can be used to advance this goal 
run throughout the book and the series. As just a few examples: Ruthann 
Robson’s rewritten opinion110 in Lawrence v. Texas,111 in which she has the 
Supreme Court apologize for the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, can be an 
exceptionally moving and validating opinion for LGBTQ students; Ilene 
Durst’s rewritten opinion in Nguyen v. INS could be especially important in 
the current anti-immigration climate for law students who are immigrants or 
first-generation U.S. residents;112 Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s rewritten 
Meritor v. Vinson is important for its depiction of African-American lived 
experiences, especially for African-American women;113 Lisa Pruitt’s 
rewritten opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey for its focus on poor and 
Native women;114 Lucinda M. Finley’s rewritten opinion115 in Geduldig v. 
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Aiello116 for its eloquent and empathetic recitation of how pregnancy 
burdened the women in that case; Ann Bartow’s expanded narrative in 
Gebser v. Lago Vista, in which she makes clear that a 50-year-old male 
teacher who had sexual intercourse with his 15-year-old student was engaged 
in rape, not a romantic relationship.117 These stories can validate students 
who have had similar experiences, can provide a needed counter-narrative to 
the stereotypes that underlay the original opinions, and can demonstrate new 
perspectives and experiences for more traditional students, which can relieve 
minority students from the responsibility to shoulder the counter-arguments 
and narratives solely on their own.118 
Reading and writing judicial opinions whose authors have purposefully 
re-envisioned the status quo—and who often have done so without resorting 
to conventional formulas and frameworks—helps students feel more at home 
as writers. The feminist judgments projects exemplify many approaches to 
legal reasoning and writing. Knowing that there was not only one right 
answer, and not only one right way to argue, empowers students who wish to 
argue for change. By engaging with a full spectrum of intentional rewritings, 
students learn to experiment themselves, not only because crafting 
alternatives allows them to advocate for causes they believe in, but also 
because it allows them to participate in a richly creative and constructive 
process. 
2. Introducing Students to Novel Arguments 
When students read a Supreme Court opinion that has brushed aside a 
particular argument, they “learn” that the argument is unimportant and should 
not be raised again. But many of the feminist judgments illustrate that some 
of these discarded arguments have great value. Just a few examples include: 
Leslie C. Griffin’s Establishment Clause analysis in Harris v. McRae, 
demonstrating the threadbare nature of the original opinion’s rationale for 
permitting states to deny medically necessary abortions to Medicaid 
recipients;119 Kim M. Mutcherson’s equal protection analysis in her rewritten 
Roe v. Wade, altering the original opinion’s famous reliance on privacy and 
 
116. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
117. Bartow, supra note 98, at 430–46. 
118. Students in minority groups in law school can be “in the position of representing their 
ascribed category to the group, whether they choose to do so or not.” See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, 
Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women, 82 
AM. J. SOC. 965 (1977); Lumumba Seegars, Being the Token, HARV. CRIMSON, (Feb. 23, 2007), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2007/2/23/being-the-token-being-the-token/ [https://perma.cc/
4MPD-AG42] (“Being the token black person is not fun. I am expected to be an authority on the 
lives of all black people. People think I represent all black people and black culture; however, at the 
same time, I’m supposed to rise above black culture.”).   
119. Griffin, supra note 55, at 247–56. 
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the trimester framework for evaluating abortion restrictions;120 and Dara E. 
Purvis’s adoption of strict scrutiny for sex discrimination cases in Frontiero 
v. Richardson, recognizing the harm of gender stereotypes for both men and 
women while reversing the denial of a married female servicemember’s right 
to receive the same spousal support benefits as a married male 
servicemember.121 An excellent teaching example for Constitutional Law 
students is Phyllis Goldfarb’s rewritten opinion122 in Bradwell v. Illinois,123 
the decision that denied Myra Bradwell the right to practice law. Goldfarb 
reviews the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and demonstrates how the 
early Reconstruction cases—Bradwell and the Slaughterhouse cases—stifled 
the radical change intended by that newly ratified amendment.124 
In Bradwell, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the state of Illinois’ denial 
of a law license to Myra Bradwell.125 This decision upended two historical 
movements: it undermined the then-current wave of feminism focusing on 
formal equality as well as the potentially expansive interpretation of the 
Reconstruction Amendments adopted after the Civil War.126 The rewritten 
judgment shows students how a fearful Court suppressed the momentous 
power of the words and history of the Fourteenth Amendment. It gives 
students an important historical lesson and shows them how we live with the 
specter of these nineteenth-century decisions to this day. It stimulates 
students to ask how the United States could have an amendment like the 
Fourteenth, but still have Jim Crow laws and open sex discrimination. By 
reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause and giving it the reading it 
deserved, Goldfarb’s opinion provides a new source of argument and a model 
for making the argument.127 
3.  Encouraging Comparative Analysis and Plural Perspectives 
Just as looking at concurrences and dissents helps students become 
aware of differing perspectives and ways of constructing knowledge, 
contrasting the original opinions with the feminist opinions opens up 
examination of several questions: Which of the judgments would better serve 
 
120. Kim M. Mutcherson, Rewritten Opinion in Roe v. Wade, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 5, at 151–67. 
121. Dara E. Purvis, Rewritten Opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, in U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 173–84. 
122. Phyllis Goldfarb, Rewritten Opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 5, at 58–77. 
123. 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
124. Goldfarb, supra note 122, at 58–77. 
125. Bradwell, U.S. 130 at 139. 
126. Kimberly Holst, Commentary on Bradwell v. Illinois, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra 
note 5, at 55.  
127. Goldfarb, supra note 122, at 60. 
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the cause of advancing justice? What makes a particular judgment appear to 
be “feminist” in comparison with the original? 
Beyond this kind of comparison, the feminist judgments projects offer 
other opportunities for comparative analysis, including analysis across 
disciplines and jurisdictions, as well as over time. For example, Rosemary 
Hunter is optimistic that by examining the opinions in one jurisdiction over 
time, she will find judgments by sitting judges that “acknowledge and 
incorporate excluded knowledges—and particularly feminist knowledge 
about women’s lives.”128 Her goal is to find “ways in which they consistently 
articulate an understanding of the world that is different from the 
conventional understandings espoused (explicitly or implicitly) by their 
judicial colleagues.”129 When these judges introduce new modes of 
reasoning, their colleagues may sometimes go along with them, and as a 
result, “the law opens up a little.”130 
As already noted, the rewritten judgments contain numerous examples 
of the diversity among feminist theories. Particularly interesting examples 
can be found in the rewritten opinions of feminists on the bench. In the U.S. 
Feminist Judgments volume, for example, one of the rewritten opinions131 is 
that of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in United States v. Virginia.132 
Comparing Valorie Vojdik’s rewrite with Justice Ginsburg’s original 
highlights the debate between formal and substantive equality theory. 
Similarly, the decisions of one self-identified feminist judge of the UK 
Supreme Court, Lady Hale, were rewritten in the British project.133 
Examples illustrating the wide variety of decision-making methods can 
be found in the New Zealand and Australian projects. The New Zealand 
project recognizes traditions that come from Māori (Indigenous New 
Zealanders) and Pakeha (New Zealanders of European descent). As a result, 
 
128. Rosemary Hunter, Comment: Diversity and Legal Reasoning, 7 FEMINISTS@LAW 1 
(2017). Professor Hunter’s optimism may be warranted. For the first time, the Canadian Supreme 
Court cited one of the Canadian feminist judgments in an opinion. See R. v. Goldfinch, 2019 S.C.C. 
38 (citing Jennifer Koshan, Marriage and Advance Consent to Sex: A Feminist Judgment in R v JA, 
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129. Hunter, supra note 128, at 2. 
130. Id. at 1.  
131. See Vojdik, supra note 40, at 389. 
132. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating the Virginia Military Institute’s exclusion of women). 
133. Rosemary Hunter, Feminist Judgments as Teaching Resources, 2 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL 
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the book itself is intersectional,134 focusing primarily on “making space” for 
Māori culture and law within the judgments.135 
In the Australian project, several Indigenous authors rejected the 
conventional form and content of a judgment, with one contributor 
explaining her inability to write a judicial opinion and writing an essay 
instead. The essay explains that using the required methodology would not 
allow “open places for Nunga (Australians of Aboriginal descent) women 
because the rewriting needs to be done from ‘another space,’ outside the 
jurisdiction of the Australian common law and the sovereignty of the 
Australian state.”136 The (Canada) Indigenous Bar Association as well as a 
group of Australian scholars have begun projects that will take up the 
challenge of bringing native voices to the law through the sociolegal method 
of judgment rewriting.137 
IV. Conclusion 
Having undermined the concept of judges as neutral arbiters, how can 
we reassure law students that they will nonetheless have an opportunity to 
 
134. What legal scholars now call “intersectionality” began as a description of the lived 
experience of women of color, who must navigate aspects of their multiple identities that converge 
at a “crossroads.” See THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF 
COLOR,  at xxii (Cherie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua, eds., 4th ed. 2015). Professor Kimberlé 
Crenshaw brought intersectionality to the study of law and feminist legal theory in her 
groundbreaking work. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989). The central point of intersectionality is that multiple identities 
come together to produce unique forms of discrimination and disadvantage. Some scholars now use 
the term intersectionality more broadly to denote the effort to understand and incorporate multiple 
identities into legal analysis. See, e.g., Aisha Nicole Davis, Intersectionality and International Law: 
Recognizing Complex Identities on the Global Stage, 28 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205 (2015). 
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“[m]aking space” within “education, health research and social justice,” identifying that approach 
as “attached to a political idea such as rangatirartanga, often translated as sovereignty or self-
determination”) (citing Linda T. Smith, Choosing the Margins: The Role of Research in Indigenous 
Struggle for Social Justice, in QUALITATIVE INQUIRY AND THE CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGE 
(Norman K. Denzin & Michael D. Giardina eds., 2006). 
136. Irene Watson, First Nations Stories, Grandmother’s Law: Too Many Stories to Tell, in 
AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW, supra note 5, at 53; see also 
Thalia Anthony, Commentary on In the matter of Djappari, in AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: 
RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW, supra note 5, at 437, 441. 
137. See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Bringing Indigenous Voices Into Judicial Decision-Making, 
FEMINIST LAW PROFESSORS BLOG (Aug. 19, 2019), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2019
/08/bringing-indigeneous-voices-into-judicial-decision-making [https://perma.cc/8AEE-8MQ3] 
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advance justice before impartial and independent decision makers? After 
helping law students understand that judges, like the rest of us, are linked to 
their experiences and their communities, what can we offer them to overcome 
those connections when necessary to achieve fair outcomes? In the Appendix 
to this article, we provide short descriptions of actual use of feminist 
judgments in the classroom. Each of the teachers listed would be more than 
happy to share information about their course or experiences. We encourage 
all law instructors to use feminist judgments as a vehicle for lessons about 
the power of perspective and persuasion. The judgments are also a call for 
reflection and evaluation when the requirements of any course syllabus might 
push us toward quantity of coverage, without pausing to reflect on its quality. 
As for what we can offer students to reassure them about judges, Patricia 
Cain argued that what we want from judges is “a special ability to listen with 
connection before engaging in the separation that accompanies judgment.”138 
The ability to listen with connection is created through storytelling: 
When you listen as a judge, you must transcend your sense of self, so 
that you can really listen. Listen to the story that is being told. Do not 
prejudge it. Do not say this is not part of my experience. But listen in 
such a way as to make it part of your experience. Find some small part 
of your own self that is like the Other’s story. Identify with the Other. 
Do not contrast. Only when you have really listened, and only then, 
should you judge.139 
In Cain’s view, at least a momentary separation is necessary for judging, 
but it follows when judges allow this connection to be made: “A judge should 
transcend self to listen, and then a judge should decide with empathy and 
understanding—as a new self, if you will, for having experienced the story 
of the other.”140 
Acknowledging that judges bring their backgrounds and experiences 
with them to their decision making, the feminist judgments projects endeavor 
to make space for alternative voices without compromising judicial 
impartiality and independence.141 Within that space, feminist approaches can 
change the way that facts are perceived and understood, not only in the 
current case, but for future cases. Where the law allows discretion, judges 
applying feminist methods or persuaded by feminist perspectives may 
exercise it in different ways. As legal doctrine develops incrementally, 
 
138. Patricia Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1945, 1954 (1988). 
139. Id. at 1955. 
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feminist perspectives may eventually ease the perceived inevitability of the 
current state of the law.142 
 
 
Appendix 
Selected Law School Courses Assigning U.S. Feminist Judgments143 
1. Gender and the law seminars 
Professor: Susan Appleton, Washington University School of Law 
Course Title: Feminist Theories, Feminist Judgments 
Assigned Reading: U.S. Feminist Judgments144 and Introduction to Feminist 
Legal Theory145 
Methods and Assigned Writing: This seminar is designed to acquaint 
students with feminist legal theory, to illuminate how to discover and apply 
such theory in the rewritten opinions, and to enhance the students’ own 
writing experiences while drafting opinions and commentary. The teaching 
methods include weekly reading assignments and class discussion of one to 
three rewritten opinions along with relevant pages from Introduction to 
Feminist Legal Theory; a guest appearance by the author of one of the 
rewritten opinions in U.S. Feminist Judgments to discuss the experience; and 
the writing requirements, which include a first draft and final version of both 
a “feminist judgment” on a case that the student selects with professor 
approval and a comment on a classmate’s feminist judgment. The professor 
encourages students to be ambitious and to not necessarily limit themselves 
to rewriting opinions in which gender might be an explicit issue. Some 
projects have featured cases on topics such as campaign finance law, eminent 
domain, and public employee unions. 
 
  
 
142. See Erica Rackley, Difference in the House of Lords, 15 SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES 163–
85, 181 (2006).  
143. These and other professors discuss their courses in Teaching with Feminist Judgments: A 
Global Conversation. Crawford, Stanchi, & Berger, supra note 107. The course descriptions in the 
Appendix summarize discussions and emails with the professors. 
144. See generally U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5. 
145. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (3d ed. 2012). 
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Professor: Pam Wilkins, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law 
Course Title: Feminist Legal Theory (intersession course) 
Assigned Reading: U.S. Feminist Judgments146 and Introduction to Feminist 
Legal Theory147 
Methods and Assigned Writing: The students in the intersession course 
have read Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, and Lawrence v. Texas. The teaching methods include: 
responses to writing prompts through daily journal entries; the use of 
multimedia short videos about feminist theory and history; analysis of 
feminist judgments cases and the related statutes; and 
comparative/international analysis (student body is more than 30 percent 
Canadian). Most students have just finished their first year and Constitutional 
Law is a required second-year course, so many students read the feminist 
judgments for these cases before they read the actual U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions. Several students have told the professor that they later reread the 
feminist judgment opinions on their own when they cover the cases in their 
second-year Constitutional Law course. 
Suggestions: The professor suggests that future courses should include field 
trips or have a series of presentations by Skype to bring in international or 
comparative work. 
2. Judicial opinion writing courses 
Professor: Kathryn M. Stanchi, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William 
S. Boyd School of Law 
Course Title: Judicial Opinions: Critical Drafting and Analysis (taught at 
Temple) 
Assigned Reading: U.S. Feminist Judgments148 
Methods and Assigned Writing: The students are asked to analyze and 
compare the feminist judgments to the original opinions after reading the key 
theories that informed the rewritten judgment. Students also rewrite an 
opinion, choosing from among four cases. Students also write a cover note to 
their student commentator about what theories they incorporated, and they 
write a commentary about a classmate’s opinion. 
Suggestions: The professor has also used some of the feminist judgments in 
independent study and guided research situations to help students who were 
writing on issues of social justice. For example, she assigned Leslie Griffin’s 
 
146. See generally U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5. 
147. See generally CHAMALLAS, supra note 145. 
148. See generally U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5. 
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feminist rewrite of Harris v. McRae149 to a student who was writing a law 
review note on the fetal burial laws some states have passed. 
 
Professor: Andrea McArdle, City University of New York School of Law 
Course Title: Writing from a Judicial Perspective (advanced 4-credit 
lawyering seminar) 
Assigned Reading: U.S. Feminist Judgments150 
Methods and Assigned Writing: In this seminar, students focus on a 
pending U.S. Supreme Court case that deals with an issue of public law and 
are asked to produce an opinion deciding it. The course description begins by 
asking them what we would lose if we no longer had the benefit of a court’s 
written analysis of its reasoning? How would litigants and their advocates 
gain access to the basis for judicial decision making? What would be the 
effects on the development of legal doctrine? Students are also asked how the 
“practice” of judicial writing can foreground social justice perspectives. The 
professor uses the rewritten opinion model to encourage reflection on what 
makes an opinion justice-serving. She assigns five or six U.S. Feminist 
Judgments opinions that are linked doctrinally or thematically to the U.S. 
Supreme Court case on which the students are focusing that semester. 
Students are asked to analyze the feminist judgments in terms of structure, 
reasoning, and rhetoric, and to reflect on how the feminist authors’ 
alternative legal framings and analyses call into question the ostensibly 
neutral and objective perspective to which law lays claim. 
3. Clinical (simulation or live client) courses 
Professor: Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Mercer University School of Law 
Course Title: Social Justice Lawyering Seminar 
Assigned Reading: U.S. Feminist Judgments151 
Methods and Assigned Writing: This seminar is a simulated-impact 
litigation clinic using feminist judgments to help student learn how to 
integrate interdisciplinary work into brief writing on social justice issues. 
Students review and analyze motion and appellate briefs from watershed civil 
rights cases. They consider how the lawyers and judges used judicial 
narrative and interpretation as tools to support or oppose existing power 
structures. One of the cases studied is Loving v. Virginia, where students are 
asked to study each party’s brief, the original opinion, and the rewritten 
opinion, but in addition, they are provided with archival documents 
illuminating the historical and social context. The discussion critically 
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150. See generally U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5. 
151. Id. 
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analyzes how the litigators and judges chose to frame the arguments and what 
alternatives are possible in judicial decision making.   
Suggestions: The professor’s longer-term goal is to integrate multicultural 
rhetoric and the feminist judgments projects into the required legal writing 
curriculum. 
4. Introduction to law/jurisprudence courses 
Professor: Ross Astoria, University of Wisconsin-Parkside (undergraduate) 
Course Title: Law, Politics, and Society 
Assigned Reading: U.S. Feminist Judgments,152 Feminist Legal Theory: A 
Primer,153 and Invitation to Law and Society154 
Methods and Assigned Writing: The course centers on normative 
jurisprudence, with feminism providing the normative perspectives. The 
course introduces the canon of legal sociology. Each social theory posits a 
different role for law in constituting a particular social form, and the course 
uses the feminist judgments as “data points” to illustrate and critique these 
theoretical perspectives. While reading the feminist judgments, students are 
prompted with the following general questions: What is the doctrinal 
foundation of the judgment? What is the moral reasoning of the judgment? 
How do these differ from the original decision? Does the holding expand 
liberty and equality for women (and others)? Which opinion would you sign 
on to and why? The course then tests one or more sociological perspectives 
through the feminist judgment. The questions and conversations allow 
students to identify and evaluate how different legal holdings shape and 
reflect the organization of society. 
5. Subject-matter courses 
Professor: Bridget Crawford, Pace Law School 
Course Title or Subject Matter: Federal Income Taxation; Estate and Gift 
Taxation; or Tax Policy 
Assigned Reading: Comparison of Original and Rewritten Opinions 
Methods and Assigned Writing: In the ordinary progression of a 
“traditional” tax course, students compare an actual tax decision with one of 
the rewritten opinions in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions.155 
The selected case is preferably one that is reprinted in the casebook (i.e., the 
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students would have read it anyway), but it is presented to them in a handout, 
with the original case formatted to resemble the text of the Cambridge 
University Press book. The feminist judgments follow. Students read both 
cases in advance of class and come prepared to discuss several questions, 
distributed in advance. The same questions could be used as the basis of a 
reflection paper or a smaller group discussion followed by classroom 
presentations. The questions are: 
(1) How did the two opinions vary in terms of the language the judge 
or judges used to describe the taxpayer in the case? 
(2) Did you find the language of each opinion equally accessible? 
(3) Did whatever personal view of the taxpayer (as sympathetic, 
unsympathetic, credible, not credible, etc.) you had after reading the 
first version of the opinion change after reading the second version of 
the opinion? 
(4) Are there facts or context that came to the forefront in one version 
of the decision but not the other? 
(5) How do the cases’ outcomes differ, and which decision do you 
think is correct as a matter of law? Be as specific as possible in citing 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code or Treasury Regulations in 
your answers. 
(6) Which opinion has more persuasive reasoning? What makes that 
reasoning more persuasive in your view? 
(7) Are there factors other than law that you think might have led the 
judge to rule in a particular way? What are those factors and what in 
the language of the opinion itself makes you think so? 
(8) Can you identify any overarching theories or ideological 
commitments underlying the decisions? 
(9) Are there important facts or details that you think are missing from 
either opinion? Another way of thinking about this question is to ask 
yourself if you would have introduced more/different evidence if you 
had been the taxpayer’s lawyer. 
(10) Which do you think is the “real” court decision and which is the 
“re-imagined” decision? 
(11) (Once the feminist judgment has been identified . . .) What makes 
the judgment “feminist,” as you understand the term? If the judgment 
does not seem “feminist,” is there a term that seems more accurate? 
(12) Substantively speaking, what impact has the “real” opinion had 
on the subsequent development of the law? What would the law look 
like if the feminist judgment had been the actual opinion? Which 
approach better accords with your personal sense of fairness? Which 
approach better accords with tax policy values like efficiency, 
neutrality and horizontal equity? 
